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Abstract Professional service firms (PSFs) such as accounting firms, management
consultancies, or advertising agencies use very different forms of governance
ranging from traditional professional partnerships to public corporations. In spite of
the extensive literature, little academic work has been done to synthesize the wealth
of theoretical and empirical work on PSF governance into a more comprehensive
theory of PSF governance. Taking configuration theory as our theoretical approach,
we identify three classes of design parameter (legal form, organizational governance
structure, and the systems for managing professionals) and six contingency factors
(service commoditization, service diversification, firm size, capital intensity, firm
culture, and risk of litigation) that are synthesized into four configurations of PSF
governance. These are described, respectively, as the founder-dominated, the col-
legial, the managerial, and the entrepreneurial configuration.
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1 Introduction
The question of governance of professional service firms (PSFs) was a largely
neglected area of research until Greenwood et al. (1990) article on managing
professional partnerships. In partnerships, ownership and management are fused in
the partners, who control their business through collegial decision-making and a
form of representative democracy (Brock 2006; Empson 2006, 2007; Empson and
Chapman 2006; Greenwood and Empson 2003; Greenwood et al. 1990; Hinings
et al. 1991). Much of the subsequent work has been devoted to describing deviations
from the professional partnership form, identifying alternative archetypes such as
the corporate managed professional business form (Hinings et al. 1999; Morris and
Pinnington 1999; Pinnington and Morris 2002) or the Global Professional Network
(Brock, Powell and Hinings 1999b; Brock et al. 2007). Yet this rich vein of work
has presented a dichotomous view on governance of PSFs, in which firms choose
between professional partnerships versus corporations, between collegial clan
control versus corporate hierarchy, or between professional bureaucracy versus
adhocracy (Mintzberg 1979: 348–379, 431–467). As Empson (2012) argues a good
deal of governance systems and practices cannot be captured by these dichotomized
models. For instance, in its early days Bain & Company, a management consulting
firm, had formally been a partnership, but strongly centralized control in the person
of the founder Bill Bain (Williamson and Yoshino 1994). Another counter example
is Greenberg Traurig limited liability partnership (LLP), a fast growing Miami-
based law firm that established a highly entrepreneurial governance system, in
which collegial or hierarchical controls are replaced by an internal market system
fostering strong partner autonomy and individual performance controls (Kolz 2007).
Both cases are at odds with existing models of PSF governance and demand a
treatment of PSF governance ‘‘beyond dichotomies’’ (Empson 2012) that would
account for a broader range of governance types.
To overcome these limitations of existing research constrained to the analysis of
the partnership and/or corporate form of governance, we draw on the large number
of contingency studies providing evidence for particular patterns of empirical
relationships between situational variables and governance dimensions that have not
been systematically exploited in previous studies. In order to make a distinctive
contribution, this study takes a configurational approach (Meyer et al. 1993; Miller
1987, 1996; Mintzberg 1979; Weber 1978) to PSF governance that allows us to
synthesize existing literature by developing ideal types or configurations that can
facilitate and guide future theorizing as well as empirical research. We build upon
Harlacher’s (2010) earlier investigation and offer a revised configuration model.
We propose three classes of design parameters (legal form, organizational
governance structure, and the systems for managing professionals) and six
contingency factors (service commoditization, service diversification, firm size,
capital intensity, firm culture, and risk of litigation) that are synthesized into four
configurations of PSF governance (the founder-dominated, the collegial, the
managerial, and the entrepreneurial configuration).
The structure of the paper is as follows: first, we introduce configuration theory
as our conceptional framework and explain how we adopt this framework to address
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questions of PSF governance. Then we define and describe our three groups of
design parameters and explain contingency factors related to the strategy,
organization, and environment of the firm and discuss their effects on specific
design parameters. We will then take the interdependencies explicitly into account
by synthesizing them into four configurations of PSF governance. Finally, we
discuss our configurations in the light of previous research. The paper closes with
concluding thoughts.
2 Configuration theory and governance
Configuration theory has been widely used in organization studies (Albers 2005;
Dess et al. 1993; Miles and Snow 1978; Mintzberg 1979; Short et al. 2008) and has
become a major school of thought (Mintzberg 1990; Wolf 2000). In contrast to
contingency theory, configuration theory aims to understand organizations in a
systemic way, ‘‘lumping together’’ (Mintzberg 1990) a significant number of
different factors resulting in rich descriptions of idealized types of organizations
(Meyer et al. 1993).
The basic assumption underlying configuration theory is that among the almost
unlimited number of permutations of organizational and situational variables, only a
few will be useful for understanding organizations and predicting their behavior
(Miller 1981, 1986). Mintzberg (1979: 216–226, 299–304) describes this in terms of
three hypotheses regarding successful configurations. First, an effective organiza-
tion structure requires a close fit between situational factors and structural design
parameters. Second, the design parameters must be internally consistent. Third,
combining the first two hypotheses, successful configurations achieve consistency
among both design parameters and situational factors. Configurations thus derive
their usefulness from describing a few ideal types which should match their real
counterparts approximately (Bunge 1996; Meyer et al. 1993; Miller and Friesen
1984).
A set of configurations can generally be determined in three ways. It can be
derived conceptually, usually referred to as a typology, or can be empirically
grounded, usually called a taxonomy (Meyer et al. 1993; Miller 1996). Since
typologies are based on theoretical considerations, they should have strong
explanatory power and facilitate further empirical work. The best typologies are
‘‘neat, memorable, and evocative’’ (Miller 1996, 506). Taxonomies are founded on
quantitative data and describe patterns or clusters in the data. Since a certain data set
is the basis, taxonomies may suffer from lack of theoretical significance or from
unreliable results, thus producing conflicting or ambiguous findings (Miller 1996).
Proponents of PSF archetype theory have taken a third, though also empirical
approach to develop configurations. This approach uses the ‘‘identification of the
interpretive scheme and of how that relates to structural attributes and processes’’ as
a starting point ‘‘to uncover coherent patterns of organizing’’ (Greenwood and
Hinings 1993, 1055).
In our paper, we follow the first approach by theoretically constructing a
typology of PSF governance models. Following previous research on PSF
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governance we consider both ownership and control as aspects of firm governance.
While owners have a formal right to control the firm and appropriate the firm’s
profits, the effective control is actually exercised through organizational structures
and systems (Hansmann 1996). As a consequence, governance of PSFs has to
address different groups of governance dimensions (see Fig. 1). First, it has to
specify different ownership types or legal forms of PSFs (Empson and Chapman
2006; Greenwood and Empson 2003). Second, regarding the dispersion of the
effective right to control throughout the organization, we have to incorporate
dimensions concerning the organization structure that determines who is in control
and who is held accountable for specific actions. Drawing on earlier governance
studies (Albers 2005; Brown et al. 1996; Empson and Chapman 2006), we
distinguish specialization, centralization, degree of participation in decision-
making, and formalization as key structural features of the organization of PSF
governance. Third, the framework has to address the unique systems designed to
manage professionals. Following Lorsch and Tierney (2002), we regard remuner-
ation and promotion decisions as ‘‘critical governance issues’’ for PSFs that ‘‘vitally
affect the organization’s future’’ (p. 129) and, therefore, focus our analysis on firms’
remuneration and promotion systems.
In addition, we reviewed studies from the literature on PSFs as well as the more
general organization studies literature to identify factors that influence the choice of
particular governance design parameters. In total, we identified six different
contingency factors that influence several or all of the governance dimensions. In
his call for a configurational approach in organization studies, Miller argues that
‘‘there exist at least three classes of factors which are necessary to richly describe
the process of organizational adaptation’’ (Miller 1981, 8), those being strategy,
environment, and organization. In our case, we identified service commoditization,
diversification, and size (related to firm’s strategy), capital intensity and culture
(related to the organization), and the risk of litigation (related to the environment) as
Fig. 1 Design parameters of PSF governance
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significant contingency factors. In order to identify consistent configurations we
developed a matrix of cause and effect relationships describing theoretically or
empirically grounded interrelationships between contingency factors and gover-
nance dimensions. The last step was to identify those consistent patterns and
organize them meaningfully around unifying themes or imperatives (Miller 1987).
We identified four imperatives of PSF governance referring to leadership,
collegiality, managerial hierarchy, and entrepreneurial growth. These four imper-
atives correspond to the founder-dominated, collegial, managerial, and entrepre-
neurial configuration, respectively. A summary of our approach to PSF governance
configurations is presented in the following Fig. 2.
3 Design parameters of PSF governance
3.1 The legal form of PSF governance
Four legal forms of governance are generally distinguished for PSFs: the public
corporation, the privately held corporation, the LLP, and the general (i.e. unlimited
liability) partnership (Empson and Chapman 2006; Greenwood and Empson 2003).
The main characteristic that distinguishes partnerships and private corporations
from public corporations is the locus of ownership, which lies with professionals
working in the firm in the former cases, and with external shareholders in the latter
case. Partnerships and private corporations are distinguished by the degree of
ownership liability. Legal details vary by jurisdiction, but a private corporation
usually has limited liability. In a general partnership, however, all partners share
Fig. 2 Constructing configurations of PSF governance
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unlimited personal liability for actions of other partners taken on behalf of the
partnership. Over the past 20 years, the LLP has been introduced as a legal form that
has elements of both partnership and corporation (McCahery 2004) as partners
usually do not have personal liability for the actions of other partners (for
differences of UK and US LLPs see McCahery and Vermeulen 2004; Bank 2006;
Morse 2004; Bromberg and Ribstein 2007).
3.2 The organizational structure of PSF governance
3.2.1 Specialization of control rights
An organization structure shall be called unspecialized, if few different organiza-
tional units are distinguished regarding the distribution of control rights in the firm
and shall be called specialized, if many different organizational units are
distinguished (Graubner 2006). Many large PSFs are specialized according to at
least three characteristics (Greenwood et al. 2010). The first and obvious
characteristic is geography, establishing different offices and sometimes regional
office systems within the PSF. The other two characteristics are client industry (e.g.,
financial services, automotive or pharmaceuticals) and type of service (e.g., M&A
and tax law in a law firm, or corporate strategy and organization in a management
consulting firm). They establish what are usually called practice areas, competence
centers, service lines, or areas of expertise. A professional will usually belong to one
office, but may belong to several ‘‘practice areas.’’ For simplicity, we will refer to
the structural entities that result from specialization, be they offices, regional office
systems, or practice areas as organizational units.
3.2.2 Centralization of control rights
Centralization and decentralization are concepts that have received wide attention in
the literature and have been defined in many different ways (Kieser and Walgenbach
2007, 194–196; Mintzberg 1979: 181–213). Central to most of these definitions is
the distribution of power (Hall 2002), which is closely related to the distribution of
effective control rights. Decentralization deals with the dispersion of control rights
from the top to lower levels of the organization. For our definition of centralization,
we again employ the concept of organizational units: if many control rights are
retained at the level of the firm, i.e. the decisions made affect the whole firm, rather
than only subsidiary organizational units, and few are exercised at subsidiary levels,
we call the organization structure centralized. Conversely, if few control rights are
retained at the level of the firm and many are exercised at subsidiary levels, we refer
to a decentralized organization structure. The lower the level of those organizational
units, where most control rights are exercised, the more decentralized is the
organization. On an organizational level, the governance dimension of centraliza-
tion distinguishes a ‘‘one firm’’ governance model from a ‘‘network firm’’ model, in
which the subsidiary parts may have great independence from the parent firm and
may even be regarded as individual PSFs (a ‘‘network of firms’’ model).
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3.2.3 Degree of participation in decision-making
The degree of participation in decision-making is widely employed in the literature
and often referred to decision-making being either collegial or hierarchical (e.g.,
Greenwood and Empson 2003; Tolbert and Stern 1991). An organization structure
shall be called hierarchical, if few professionals, who are members of an
organizational unit, share the effective right to control this unit. Conversely, an
organization structure shall be called collegial, if many professionals in an
organizational unit share the effective right to control this unit. The decision-making
dimension is concerned with the distribution of control rights within the individual
organizational units, not with the number of units or the distribution of control rights
among them.
3.2.4 Formalization of control rights
We call an organization structure formalized, if many control rights are exercised ex
ante by defining rules and regulations for different contingencies. We refer to an
organization structure as not formalized, if many control rights are exercised ad hoc
without a reduction of discretion due to rules and regulations. For example, a
committee responsible for determining which young professionals should be
promoted at a certain time may take ad hoc decisions or follow a set of predefined
rules regulating promotional decisions. The degree of formalization can be
differentiated according to the object of formalization. This can be a certain
process that is carried out within the organization structure, the output of such a
process, or a certain position or role in the organization structure (Mintzberg 1979:
81–94). In the latter case, the rights and duties of a position are specified. In the
absence of formalized positions, the distribution of control rights may well be
contested and different organizational members may claim the right to make certain
decisions. Formalization of positions by specifying rights and duties reduces the
ambiguity of the distribution of control rights within an organization.
3.3 Management systems for professionals
3.3.1 Remuneration system
The remuneration system of a PSF determines how its professionals are paid. The
simplest type of remuneration system pays every professional a fixed income
according to his or her position. For incentive reasons, at least part of a
professional’s income will often be contingent on performance, even if the
professional is not an owner of the firm. We differentiate between three different
types of contingent income. First, lockstep remuneration divides the income that is
contingent on firm performance according to seniority. The lockstep remuneration
system is considered the traditional profit sharing system for PSFs with internal
ownership, especially partnerships. Historically, partnerships in the US were
required to have profit-sharing rules close to equal sharing (Levin and Tadelis 2005,
156). Under this system, all partners of a certain seniority level (i.e., who have been
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partners for the same number of years) receive the same profit share, irrespective of
their billings or any other performance measure. However, the concept of dividing
contingent income according to seniority is applicable to non-partner professionals
as well. The lockstep system is thought to facilitate collegial interaction among
professionals, such as internal referrals, knowledge sharing, and teamwork, since
‘‘the only way to improve individual remuneration is to improve overall
profitability’’ (Angel 2007, 204). A drawback of the lockstep system is that free-
riding and shirking are encouraged if collegial controls among profit-sharing
professionals fail (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983a; Leibowitz and Tollison 1980).
Second, eat-what-you-kill remuneration awards contingent income according to
some measure of individual output that makes a direct contribution to firm profits,
such as client charges or hours billed. More and more firms have introduced
performance-based elements into their remuneration system in recent years, both on
the partner level (e.g., Griffiths 2005) and on the non-partner level (e.g., Williams
2007), although the elite British law firms especially have been reluctant to abandon
the lockstep system (Angel 2007; Begum 2007). The eat-what-you-kill system
discourages free-riding and shirking and makes it easier to retain ‘‘star’’
professionals that contribute disproportionately strongly to total firm profits (Levin
and Tadelis 2005), possibly at the expense of collegiality, since time spent
supporting other professionals may not be counted as own contribution to firm
profits and thus may not be incentivized financially. While lockstep and eat-what-
you-kill remuneration have been the focus of the PSF literature, we will introduce a
third type of remuneration system: Scorecard remuneration determines contingent
income according to some measure of individual behavior, such as feedback on
client interaction, leadership skills, etc. provided by other professionals or even
clients. Of course, all three systems can be combined in the compensation of a
single professional, yet they represent conceptually distinct remuneration systems.
3.3.2 Promotion system
In partnerships or similarly organized PSFs, up-or-out promotion systems have
traditionally been the norm, especially in elite firms (e.g., Gilson and Mnookin
1989; Smigel 1969). Under such a system, professionals are denied permanent
tenure unless they are elected partner. Professionals who are not elected partner
within a specified number of years are fired or expected to leave the firm (Morris
and Pinnington 1998). The up-or-out system was pioneered by Paul Cravath around
1900 and is also known as the ‘‘Cravath system’’ (Nelson 1988, 71–72; Swaine
1948). In some PSFs, especially law firms, the up-or-out process applies only at the
point of partner selection, whereas in other PSFs, such as management consulting
firms, the up-or-out promotion system usually covers several promotion levels, and
professionals who are not promoted to the next level are expected to leave. In recent
years, exceptions to the up-or-out promotion system have become increasingly more
common, creating permanent positions in PSFs (Gilson and Mnookin 1989; Morris
and Pinnington 1998, 1999; Sherer and Lee 2002). Under this model, professionals
are granted permanent tenure without being promoted to full partner status and
becoming residual claimants. Instead, they may enjoy some of the partner privileges
132 Business Research (2014) 7:125–160
123
and responsibilities and bear titles such as ‘‘specialist’’, ‘‘junior partner’’, or
‘‘salaried partner.’’ Usually, firms that have previously employed the up-or-out
promotion system will not abandon it completely, but use permanent positions as an
option to retain professionals who are valuable to the firm, but, for whatever reason,
are not elected partner.
4 Contingency factors of PSF governance
In this section, we review studies from the literature on PSFs as well as the more
general organization studies literature to identify factors that influence the choice of
particular governance models along the dimensions developed in the previous
section. In total, we identify six different contingency factors that influence several
or all of the governance dimensions. In the following, we will summarize some of
the most important findings of this research for each set of contingency factor. A
more comprehensive explication of 38 contingency hypotheses and their supporting
theoretical/empirical evidence is presented in Table 1.
4.1 Service commoditization
Professional services are generally thought to be customized to ‘‘particular cases’’
(Abbott 1988). A commodity service, on the other hand, is delivered to many
different clients without being adapted to the individual circumstances of any
particular client and is available from several different service suppliers.
Commodity services (such as car insurance or a bank transfer) are not regarded
as professional services. Yet among professional services, there are considerable
differences regarding the degree of customization or commoditization (Hansen et al.
1999; Maister 1993). Some professional services that used to require the case-by-
case application of expert judgment have been largely commoditized through
professional standards and technological advances. For example, the traditional core
service provided by accounting firms, the audit itself, has been commoditized
through accounting standards and computer technology, which has reduced quality
differences between the providers. Several studies (Alchian and Demsetz 1972;
Fama and Jensen 1983a, b; Levin and Tadelis 2005; Morrison and Wilhelm 2004)
imply a relationship between the degree of service commoditization in PSFs and
their locus of ownership, with different ways of reasoning. Despite differing
theoretical backgrounds, they allow the conclusion that PSFs offering customized
services are more efficiently run with internal ownership, whereas PSFs offering
commoditized services are better off having external ownership. Similarly, service
commoditization and formalization of control rights are closely related. As service
delivery is increasingly repetitive, it is efficient to formalize the processes and
outputs of service delivery, as well as the organizational roles and positions
involved in it. Hansen et al. (1999) show how knowledge management processes in
accounting and consulting firms vary according to the commoditization or
customization of services. Service commoditization also affects the systems used
to manage professionals. In a firm that delivers highly commoditized professional
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Table 1 Selected hypotheses on the relation between contingency factors and PSF design parameters
Contingency factor Hypothetical relation with design parameter Supporting evidence
Service
commoditization
Effects on locus of ownership
Hypothesis 1.1: The greater the degree of service commoditization, the
more likely a PSF will have external ownership, ceteris paribus
Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Dow and
Putterman (2000); Fama and Jensen
(1983a); Greenwood and Empson
(2003); Levin and Tadelis (2005);
Morrison and Wilhelm (2008)
Effects on specialization
Hypothesis 1.2: The specialization of control rights will increase with
the degree of service commoditization, ceteris paribus
Mintzberg (1979)
Effects on decision-making
Hypothesis 1.3: The higher the degree of service commoditization, the
more hierarchical the distribution of control rights will be, ceteris
paribus
Maister (1993); Alvesson (1995) for the
case of service customization
Effects on formalization
Hypothesis 1.4: The higher the degree of service commoditization, the
more formalized the organization structure will be, ceteris paribus
Alt (2006); Armbru¨ster (2006);
Hansen et al. (1999); Morris and
Empson (1998)
Effects on the remuneration system
Hypothesis 1.5a: The higher the degree of service commoditization,
the less a PSFs remuneration system will rely on contingent income,
ceteris paribus
Hypothesis 1.5b: The higher the degree of service commoditization,
the more contingent income will be distributed according to
scorecard remuneration, ceteris paribus
Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
Effects on the promotion system
Hypothesis 1.6: The higher the degree of service commoditization, the
less likely a PSF is to use an up-or-out promotion system, ceteris
paribus
Levin and Tadelis (2005); McKenna
(2006); Morris and Pinnington
(1998)
Service diversification Effects on specialization
Hypothesis 2.1: The greater the degree of service diversification, the
more specialized a PSF’s organization structure will be, ceteris
paribus
Brock et al. (2007); Greenwood et al.
(2002); Rose and Hinings (1999);
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006)
Effects on centralization
Hypothesis 2.2: The greater the degree of service diversification, the
more decentralized a PSF’s organization structure will be, in
particular if it is highly specialized, ceteris paribus
Amburgey and Dacin (1994); Rumelt
(1974); Williamson (1975)
Effects on decion-making
Hypothesis 2.3: The greater the degree of service diversification, the
more hierarchical will be the distribution of control rights,
especially at the firm level or similarly comprehensive
organizational units, ceteris paribus
Amburgey and Dacin (1994); Brock
et al. (1999a); Greenwood and
Empson (2003); Malhotra et al.
(2006); Rose and Hinings (1999)
Effects on remuneration system
Hypothesis 2.4: The greater the degree of service diversification, the
less likely a PSF is to use a lockstep remuneration system, ceteris
paribus
Koza and Lewin (1999); Nelson
(1988); Sherer (2007)
Counter position: Gilson and Mnookin
(1985)
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Table 1 continued
Contingency factor Hypothetical relation with design parameter Supporting evidence
Firm size Effects on locus of ownership
Hypothesis 3.1: The likelihood of a PSF having external ownership
will increase with firm size, ceteris paribus
Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Demsetz
(1983); Dow and Putterman (2000);
Fama and Jensen (1983a); Leibowitz
and Tollison (1980); Morrison and
Wilhelm (2004)
Effects on the degree of liability
Hypothesis 3.2: The likelihood of a PSF having unlimited liability will
significantly decrease with increasing firm size, ceteris paribus
Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Bank
(2006); Fama and Jensen (1983a);
Morrison and Wilhelm (2004)
Effects on specialization
Hypothesis 3.3: The specialization of control rights increases with firm
size, ceteris paribus
Greenwood and Hinings (1993);
Mintzberg (1979); Montagna (1968);
Graubner (2006)
Effects on centralization
Hypothesis 3.4: The centralization of control rights decreases with
increasing firm size, ceteris paribus
Child (1972); Hinings and Lee (1971);
(Pugh et al. 1969); Graubner (2006)
Effects on decision-making
Hypothesis 3.5: Hierarchical decision-making increases with firm size,
ceteris paribus
Blau (1984); Greenwood and Empson
(2003); Tolbert and Stern (1991)
Effects on formalization
Hypothesis 3.6a: The formalization of control rights increases with
firm size, ceteris paribus
Hypothesis 3.6b: The use of standardization of processes and outputs
increases with firm size, ceteris paribus
Hypothesis 3.6c: The use of mutual adjustment and direct supervision/
fiat decreases with increasing firm size, ceteris paribus
Blau (1984); Graubner (2006);
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967);
Malhotra et al. (2006); Mintzberg
(1979)
Effects on the remuneration system
Hypothesis 3.7: The use of lockstep remuneration systems will
decrease with firm size, ceteris paribus
Gilson and Mnookin (1985); Farrell
and Scotchmer (1988); Kummel
(1996); Levin and Tadelis (2005);





Effects on locus of ownership
Hypothesis 4: The higher the amount of financial capital required by a
PSF, the more likely it is to be externally owned, ceteris paribus
Dow and Putterman (2000); Fama and
Jensen (1983a); Morrison and





Effects on locus of ownership
Hypothesis 5.1: The more heterogeneous the values and beliefs of a
PSF, the more likely it is to be externally owned, ceteris paribus
Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Dow and
Putterman (2000); Morris and
Pinnington (1998); Wilhelm and
Downing (2001)
Effects on decision-making
Hypothesis 5.2a: The more heterogeneous the values and beliefs of a
PSF, the stronger are the effects of the locus of ownership and on
hierarchical decision-making, ceteris paribus
Hypothesis 5.2b: In case of external ownership, increasing
heterogeneity of values and beliefs leads to hierarchical decision-
making, ceteris paribus
Hypothesis 5.2c: In case of internal ownership, increasing
heterogeneity of values and beliefs leads to collegial decision-
making, ceteris paribus, but also to lower organizational stability
Greenwood and Empson (2003);
Greenwood et al. (1990); Nanda
(2003)
Effects on formalization
Hypothesis 5.3: Increasing heterogeneity of values and beliefs leads to
increasing formalization of control rights, ceteris paribus
Benham and Keefer (1991); Mintzberg
(1979); Ouchi (1980)
Effects on the remuneration system
Hypothesis 5.4: Increasing heterogeneity of values and beliefs leads to
less use of lockstep remuneration and thus more eat-what-you-kill or
scorecard remuneration, ceteris paribus
Alt (2006); Alchian and Demsetz
(1972); Gilson and Mnookin (1985)
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services, most steps necessary for service provision can be well determined in
advance and, because of their standardized, routine nature, can also be easily
monitored. A scorecard remuneration system that relies on detailed measures of
individual behavior should more likely be implemented in such PSFs than in firms
that deliver highly customized services, in which a lockstep system may be the only
feasible remuneration system if service provision requires strong team production
(also see Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Moreover, we suggest that firms providing
customized services make more use of up-or-out promotion systems than firms
providing commodity services. As Levin and Tadelis (2005) argue, up-or-out acts as
a quality signal used when clients find it difficult to estimate service quality in
advance, especially when services are customized and novel.
Table 1 continued




Effects on decision-making and centralization
Hypothesis 6.1: The more prevalent traditional professional values are
in a PSF, the more collegial will be its organization structure, ceteris
paribus
Hypothesis 6.2a: The more prevalent corporate values are in a PSF, the
more centralized will be its organization structure, ceteris paribus
Hypothesis 6.2b: The more prevalent entrepreneurial values are in a
PSF, the more decentralized will be its organization structure,
ceteris paribus
Cooper et al. (1996); Greenwood et al.
(1990); Greenwood and Empson
(2003); Maister (1993); Lorsch and
Tierney (2002); Reihlen et al. (2009)
Effects on formalization
Hypothesis 6.3: The more prevalent corporate values are in a PSF, the
more formalized will be its organization structure, ceteris paribus
Brock et al. (1999a); Cooper et al.
(1996); Morris and Pinnington
(1999); Pinnington and Morris
(2002)
Effects on the remuneration system
Hypothesis 6.4a: The more prevalent traditional professional values
are in a PSF, the more the firm’s remuneration system will resemble
the lockstep system, ceteris paribus
Hypothesis 6.4b: The more prevalent corporate values are in a PSF, the
more the firm’s remuneration system will resemble scorecard
systems, ceteris paribus
Hypothesis 6.4c: The more prevalent entrepreneurial values are in a
PSF, the more the firm’s remuneration system will resemble eat-
what-you-kill systems, ceteris paribus
Alt (2006); Empson (2007); Gilson and
Mnookin (1985)
Risk of litigation Effects on the degree of liability
Hypothesis 7.1: The higher the risk of litigation that a PSF faces, the
more likely the PSF is to choose a legal form that limits its liability,
ceteris paribus
Bank (2006); Carter-Pegg and Potter
(2006); Freedman and Finch (1997);
Harris (2005); Wilhelm and
Downing (2001)
Effects on locus of ownership
Hypothesis 7.2: The higher the risk of litigation that a PSF faces, the
more likely it is to have external ownership, ceteris paribus
Fama and Jensen (1983b); Greenwood
and Empson (2003)
Effects on formalization
Hypothesis 7.3: The higher the risk of litigation that a PSF faces, the
higher its degree of formalization, ceteris paribus
Hypothesis 7.4: The higher the risk of litigation that a PSF faces, the
more standardization of processes, outputs, and skills will be used as
coordination mechanisms, ceteris paribus
Mintzberg (1979); O’Leary (2007)
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4.2 Service diversification
The demands of global clients for integrated service providers, the declining
profitability of the core audit services, and the competitive advantage of existing
client relationships in auditing have been cited as reasons for service diversification
(Aharoni 1999; Malhotra et al. 2006; Rose and Hinings 1999). Large advertising
firms have also increased the scope of their services to include public relations,
strategic marketing consulting, and market research (Grabher 2001; von Nord-
enflycht 2007). In a similar fashion, several large consulting firms have pursued the
strategy of providing integrated management and IT consulting services and have
expanded into IT systems integration and outsourcing services (e.g., Accenture/
Andersen Consulting, see DeLong 2003). However, while most of the PSF
archetype literature focuses on diversification across professional boundaries (e.g.,
Brock et al. 2007; Greenwood et al. 2002; Rose and Hinings 1999), and this
evidently constitutes the highest degree of service diversification, we include
various forms of diversification within one profession or industry in our definition of
this contingency factor. As many studies have shown, service diversification
increases specialization and decentralization (Mintzberg 1979: 380–430; William-
son 1975: 132–154). Moreover, a specialized firm that offers diversified services
will find extensive collegial control at the firm level difficult. The reason is that few
professionals will have the necessary knowledge, or interest, to participate
efficiently in decisions covering diverse areas of expertise (Greenwood and Empson
2003). We, therefore, argue that more diversified PSFs are more likely to apply
hierarchical, centralized governance structures. Furthermore, we contend that the
more diversified a firm’s services are, the more likely it is that some services will be
inherently more profitable than others. Sherer (2007) discusses the constraining
effect lockstep remuneration has on the diversification of law firms into regions that
command lower billing rates, using the US law firms Baker and McKenzie (eat-
what-you-kill) and Cleary Gottlieb (lockstep) as examples. An example outside the
legal profession is the declining profitability of accounting services, which was a
key reason for accounting firms to expand into consulting services (Koza and Lewin
1999). Under such circumstances, a pure lockstep system is more difficult to sustain
across different services.
4.3 Firm size
The size of a PSF measured by the number of professionals depends to some extent
on the existence of economies of scale or scope. It is sometimes assumed that PSFs
do not exhibit strong economies of scale and may even experience diseconomies of
scale (Løwendahl 2005). While economies of scale will be less obvious than in
manufacturing firms, technological innovations such as those described in Morrison
and Wilhelm (2008) may impose significant minimum efficient scales on PSFs. The
use of expensive assets such as access to specialized databases tends to impose scale
economies on a firm. More importantly, PSFs may increase in size due to assumed
benefits of offering a larger scope of services. There are a number of relevant
effects: First, the incentive of internal ownership to reduce shirking in service
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delivery (Alchian and Demsetz 1972), to engage in mutual consulting, bonding and
monitoring (Fama and Jensen 1983a), as well as to provide mentoring to junior
professionals (Morrison and Wilhelm 2004), declines with increasing firm size.
Second, this argument can in principle be extended to the degree of liability. As
long as a firm is small enough to allow effective monitoring among internal owners,
unlimited liability provides a very strong incentive to engage in such activities. As
the firm size increases, however, the incentive benefits of unlimited liability will be
quickly outweighed by the costs and risks associated with it. Third, as previous
studies have shown, larger PSFs are more specialized, decentralized, and apply
hierarchical decision-making, and are more likely to formalize procedures such as
operating rules and personnel regulations (Brown et al. 1996; Graubner 2006;
Greenwood et al. 1993; Greenwood and Empson 2003; Greenwood et al. 2010).
4.4 Capital intensity
PSFs are usually thought not to be capital intensive (Greenwood and Empson 2003;
von Nordenflycht 2010), since they mainly depend on ‘‘assets that go down the
elevator each night’’. However, as the development of the investment banking
industry has shown (Augar 2000; Morrison and Wilhelm 2008), some professional
industries have become very capital intensive in recent decades. Access to capital
may also provide competitive advantage in industries in which service provision
itself has not become very capital intensive, such as the advertising industry (see
von Nordenflycht 2009 for an explanation of the emergence of large advertising
conglomerates). Finally, firms in the accounting and consulting industry may need
significant financial resources to pay for information technology (Greenwood and
Empson 2003). As ‘‘monitoring and work incentives’’ as well as ‘‘investment,
wealth, and diversification’’ theories (Dow and Putterman 2000; Fama and Jensen
1983b) and illustrative evidence from the advertising industry (von Nordenflycht
2009) suggest, more capital-intensive PSFs are more likely to be externally owned.
4.5 Firm culture
Culture conceived as shared key values and beliefs (Smirchich 1983) or shared
interpretative schemes (e.g., Cooper et al. 1996; Empson and Chapman 2006;
Greenwood et al. 1990) has been widely discussed in the PSF literature. In our
analysis, we focus on two specific aspects of a PSF’s culture—the degree of
homogeneity and the nature of a firm’s culture. Homogeneous values and beliefs
correspond to a single, strong firm culture, whereas heterogeneous values point to a
weak overall culture, or a set of rival subcultures. Greenwood and Empson (2003)
argue that organizational homogeneity facilitates building consensus among
professionals, i.e. facilitates a collegial, decentralized governance structure. They
contend that ‘‘where there are different sets of values, however, consensus-based
approaches and knowledge sharing are more difficult to sustain’’ (p. 923) and
conclude that the partnership form of governance becomes less efficient relative to
public corporations as heterogeneity increases. Also, a strong culture like a clan
lacks ‘‘[…] the explicit rules of the bureaucracy’’ (Ouchi 1979, 838) and, therefore,
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uses a set of homogeneous values and beliefs as a substitute for formal and
bureaucratic modes of control (Mintzberg 1983; Ouchi 1980). In addition, Gilson
and Mnookin’s (1985) study on law firm remuneration systems suggests that
increasing heterogeneity of values and beliefs makes it more likely that firms will
use eat-what-you-kill or scorecard instead of lockstep remuneration.
Second, we suggest that the nature of the firm culture affects organizational
governance. Two sets of values, which we call ‘‘traditional’’ and ‘‘commercial’’
professional values, are usually juxtaposed. Traditional professional values
emphasize the role of the professional as a social trustee (Brint 1994). Professional
norms and self-regulating professional institutions are seen as means to prevent
professionals from exploiting the knowledge advantage they enjoy over their clients.
A change from the traditional professional values to more business-oriented,
‘‘commercial’’ values has been observed along with organizational change in PSFs
to more ‘‘corporate’’ forms of governance (e.g., Cooper et al. 1996; Suddaby et al.
2009). This was accompanied by a changing definition of professionalism.
Commercial professional values are based on the notion of expertise, rather than
public service (Brint 1994; Greenwood 2007). A PSF is regarded as a profit-oriented
business selling superior expertise to its clients. We would like to differentiate the
notion of commercial professional values, because commercialization need not lead
to a more ‘‘corporate’’ way of governance, organization, and management. Instead,
we contend that commercialization can either lead to a more ‘‘corporate’’ or to an
‘‘entrepreneurial’’ way of governance. We suggest that the values of professionals
can be differentiated accordingly, by splitting the commercial, i.e. non-traditional
professional values into corporate and entrepreneurial values. While both are
motivated by profitability and growth, professionals with entrepreneurial values
favor personal autonomy (for their individual commercial gain rather than altruistic
professional purposes) and thus oppose the formalization and standardization
usually associated with becoming more ‘‘corporate’’ (Empson and Chapman 2006).
The nature of values, as we suggest, affects the structure as well as the choice of
remuneration system. Traditional professional values foster collegial structures
(Greenwood and Empson 2003; Lorsch and Tierney 2002) and a lockstep
remuneration system. More prevalent corporate values in a PSF increases the
adoption of centralized and formalized structures as well as a remuneration system
that will resemble a scorecard system (Alt 2006; Cooper et al. 1996). Finally,
entrepreneurial values facilitate decentralized structures and eat-what-you-kill
systems (Maister 1993).
4.6 Risk of litigation
The risk of litigation refers to the risk of PSFs being sued, usually by their clients
over the quality of work delivered. Accounting firms’ increasing size as well as the
wealth of their personally liable partners had made them attractive litigation targets,
with litigation costs among the Big Six accounting firms reaching US$35,000 per
partner per year in 1998 (Greenwood and Empson 2003). While many PSFs in other
professional industries, such as management consulting firms and advertising
agencies chose to incorporate, accounting and law firms often remained
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partnerships, but many chose to convert to LLPs in the jurisdictions where this was
permitted (Carter-Pegg and Potter 2006; Freedman and Finch 1997; Harris 2005).
The risk of litigation that a PSF faces varies among the different professional
industries. For example, it is often more difficult for clients to perceive the quality
of management consulting services than that of auditing services, even ex post. Yet
the key difference lies in their ability to prove the PSF’s responsibility for
inadequate quality. Audits are fairly standardized services that can basically be
scrutinized for correctness. Management consulting services, on the other hand,
often require both a greater degree of discretion on the professional’s part and a
greater involvement of the client in the delivery of the service, making it more
difficult to prove negligence or malpractice. Service commoditization will generally
increase clients’ ability to observe service quality and the PSF’s responsibility, thus
raising the risk of litigation. The risk of litigation also increases if PSFs do not
handle potential conflicts of interest appropriately (see Mehran and Stulz 2007, for a
review of the empirical literature on this conflict of interest).
We can now draw a number of implications. First, the higher the risk of litigation
that a PSF faces, the more likely the PSF is to choose a legal form that will limit its
liability. Following Greenwood and Empson (2003) we can also suggest that a rising
risk of litigation will eventually result in change of ownership locus (see Fama and
Jensen 1983b). Second, to address the root cause of litigation, i.e. inadequate service
quality or a conflict of interest, firms will eventually use more standardized
recruiting and training processes intended to lower the chances of having
insufficiently qualified professionals; this will lead to standardization of skills,
which in itself serves to improve service quality. Furthermore, the establishment of
rules constraining behavior that may increase the risk of litigation needs to take
place on a hierarchical level ‘‘above’’ the one where such behavior is likely to occur,
most likely on the level of the firm, rather than that of subsidiary organizational
units, leading to centralization.
5 Configurations of PSF governance
In the preceding sections, we defined the key dimensions along which the
governance of PSFs varies and identified factors that account for such variation. The
results are several dozen cause and effect relationships that link individual causal
factors with particular governance dimensions. We thus systematically collected
theoretical and empirical evidence on the interdependencies that exist among
contingency factors and governance design parameters as far as they have been
subject to previous research. In this section, we take these interdependencies
explicitly into account by integrating individual cause and effect relationships into
ideal types, the configurations of PSF governance. By synthesizing previous
research into configurations, we offer richer descriptions of PSF governance than a
collection of bivariate relationships could achieve (Meyer et al. 1993; Wolf 2000).
We describe governance characteristics and conditions of each of these configu-
rations and use illustrations from well-known PSFs that closely resemble them (see
Table 2).




The founder-dominated governance configuration describes characteristics shared
by many young, small firms. Its dominant governance theme is centered around
leadership. While the essence of the configuration is not unique to PSFs, the
configuration is important in describing many PSFs which have a charismatic
founder or a small group of senior professionals that is vital to the firm’s success and
effectively governs the firm.
The founder-dominated governance configuration is characterized by internal
ownership, albeit more concentrated in the hands of one or a few professionals. Bain
& Company, a management consulting firm, exemplified the founder-dominated
governance configuration in several respects until it reorganized its ownership and
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control structure in 1990. Until 1985 ownership of Bain & Company had been
restricted to a ‘‘founding group’’ consisting of Bill Bain and seven senior
professionals. Ownership was thus internal and highly concentrated. In 1985, the
firm was incorporated and an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) was launched.
During the two following years, the founding group sold 30 % of their equity stake
to the ESOP for $200 million, loading the firm with debt. The firm’s ownership
structure remained highly concentrated until it was restructured in 1990 (William-
son and Yoshino 1994). In the German context, the early days of consulting firms
such as Simon, Kucher and Partners or the engineering consulting firm Miebach
Logistics until the founder resigned from the board, or small boutique corporate law
firms like Glade, Michel and Wirtz (see Gu¨nther 2012) come close to our founder-
dominated governance model.
In the same way as ownership, control rights are largely concentrated in the same
professional or professionals. The distribution of control rights is thus both
centralized and follows hierarchical decision-making. As a result of the inherent
complexity of professional work, control rights may be more widely distributed than
in the typical entrepreneurial, owner-managed non-professional firm (Blau 1984),
but still the founder-dominated configuration marks the centralized ends of the
spectra of hierarchical decision-making and distribution of control rights.
Before the firm’s restructuring, control rights at Bain & Company had been
highly centralized in the person of Bill Bain. For example, partner remuneration was
not determined according to any transparent remuneration system, but instead was
at the discretion of Bill Bain. A former partner referred to the partnership agreement
as ‘‘not a bill of rights, but the rights of Bill’’ (Gallese 1989).
The founder-dominated configuration is ‘‘characterized, above all, by what it is not
– elaborated. Typically, it has […] a loose division of labor, minimal differentiation
among its units, and a small managerial hierarchy. Little of its behavior is formalized’’
(Mintzberg 1979: 306). The control rights in this configuration are thus unspecialized
and not formalized. Power is centralized at the top and the small size of such firms
means little formalization or standardization is needed or feasible.
According to its low degree of formalization and standardization, the founder-
dominated governance configuration has neither an elaborate nor a strongly
formalized remuneration system. If ownership and control rights are sufficiently
concentrated, contingent remuneration is likely to be determined informally by the
controlling group or individual, as had been the case with Bain & Company. Unless
the nature of the services delivered allows easy to administer performance-related
remuneration, remuneration is likely to be explicitly or implicitly based on lockstep,
with the (presumably more senior) controlling group or individual earning
substantially more than other professionals.
The founder-dominated configuration offers professionals permanent positions
rather than using an up-or-out promotion system. This may be in part because firms
are often too small to make an up-or-out system feasible, but also because of the
disproportionate importance of the controlling group or individual for the firm,
which makes the firm less prone to other professionals ‘‘grabbing clients and
leaving’’ (see Rebitzer and Taylor 2007 for a discussion of this risk), if they have
been in permanent positions.
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5.1.2 Conditions
The founder-dominated configuration is typically found in small firms. As firms
grow and get older, the influence of the founding group is bound to decline. Also,
the decision-making style, which is ad hoc, but both hierarchical and centralized,
does not correspond to the requirements of large firms. Other aspects of firm
strategy such as the degree of service customization may vary in the founder-
dominated configuration. Firms following this configuration are less likely to offer
diversified services, since the human capital of the founding group should be
specialized in some respect in order for the firm to have any competitive advantage
over larger, established firms. Also, this configuration is associated with customized,
rather than commoditized services. Service commoditization generally leads to
specialization and formalization, which are aspects of the managerial configuration
rather than the founder-dominated configuration. A small, founder-dominated firm
should find it more difficult to compete with larger, established firms in
commoditized, rather than customized services.
While small, founder-dominated firms may be less willing to operate in an
environment with a high risk of litigation, this risk may vary widely among firms
and is not considered an important factor regarding the founder-dominated
governance configuration. Unless a firm stays small and manages to transfer the
special human capital from the controlling group to an eventual successor, the
founder-dominated configuration is typically a transitory governance model. Many
successful firms will simply outgrow this configuration.
5.2 Collegial governance
5.2.1 Governance characteristics
Collegial governance is founded on the idea of professional autonomy and self-
governance. These principles are best accomplished by internal ownership, in which
partners share collegial control over decision-making. Some firms closely resem-
bling the configuration, like the New York law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and
Katz, are still general partnerships with unlimited liability, whereas others have
switched to limited liability. Regarding its legal form, the collegial configuration
thus matches the ‘‘professional partnership’’ archetype, although firms operating as
private corporations may also closely resemble our configuration.
Decision-making follows a collegial structure, which allows professionals to
participate widely in important decisions, striving for consensus where possible.
However, control rights are centralized, resulting in a ‘‘one firm’’ firm, in which
most control rights reside at the level of the firm, rather than at some subordinate
organizational level.
The collegial governance configuration is characterized by a less specialized
governance structure. Wachtell Lipton, for instance, is loosely organized into eight
practice areas, but provides its services through task forces that are staffed ad hoc
from several practice areas, depending on the requirements of the individual case.
Having only one office despite an increasing amount of work involving non-US
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clients, it is not specialized by region. Interestingly, Wachtell Lipton briefly
experimented with a London office, but closed it again. Following the rise of
London as a financial center, opening a permanent London office has been discussed
numerous times (Berris and Byrne 2007), but so far the firm has stuck to its
guideline of not having branch offices preferring to work with foreign referral firms
if necessary (Illman 2007).
Wachtell Lipton epitomizes the collegial governance configuration in the
minimal formalization of control rights. Despite being a prestigious firm of more
than 80 partners, Wachtell Lipton has followed its guiding principle that ‘‘there is no
partnership agreement—only a handshake among friends’’ (Lipton 1990, as cited by
Starbuck 1993, 908). The introduction of the executive committee has somewhat
formalized decision-making, but the firm has maintained its aversion to bureaucracy
(Starbuck 1993). A collegial and informal work environment facilitates the self-
organization of work. At Wachtell Lipton, this work environment is partly
cultivated by the task forces that deal with particular cases. As Lipton (1990)
explains, ‘‘the task forces overlap with a particular lawyer leading one or more and
assisting on one or more’’ (cited by Starbuck 1993, 908).
Regarding the systems for managing professionals, the collegial governance
configuration corresponds to the professional partnership archetype. Remuneration
is based on the lockstep system: promotion on the up-or-out system. Both systems
can be found at Wachtell Lipton. The firm follows a pure lockstep system, with no
regard to billed hours, client contact, or management functions. In addition to the
lockstep partner remuneration, the year-end bonus of associates and support staff is
determined only by firm performance, not by individual performance (Lorsch and
Graff 1995). Partners at the firm value the lockstep system because it fosters
cooperation and reinforces the firm’s egalitarian culture (Starbuck 1993). Regarding
the promotion system, the founders of Wachtell Lipton decided that ‘‘no lawyer
would be hired or retained unless they expected him to become a partner’’ (Starbuck
1993, 905). The firm has followed this principle, refusing to introduce permanent
positions like permanent associates or non-equity partners, which have become
common in many other law firms (for more on this see Smets et al. 2012).
5.2.2 Conditions
The collegial governance configuration occurs in firms that offer non-diversified,
highly customized services. In contrast to other PSFs, firms following this
configuration deliberately focus on a narrow set of services for which they have
special expertise and often gain a strong reputation. In their area of expertise, they
are often at the forefront in developing innovative services that are customized to
the requirements of individual clients. In order to reinforce their reputation as the
leading PSF for their area of expertise, these firms often leave the more routine
services to competitors with a more diversified service portfolio. One of the guiding
principles (Lipton 1990, as cited by Illman 2007, 25) of Wachtell Lipton is that ‘‘the
practice of the firm is to focus on a limited number of interesting and difficult
specialties. The firm declines a significant number of matters for which its services
are sought’’. As a result of their pursuit of innovative, unique problems to solve in a
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comparatively narrow area of expertise, these firms are often rather small,
‘‘boutique’’ firms.
Their non-diversified, highly customized service offering, together with their
small size, largely determines the governance characteristics of these elite firms. For
example, a non-diversified service portfolio is the strongest factor favoring an
unspecialized, centralized distribution of control rights. Offering highly customized
services also call for little organizational specialization, because the lack of
repetitive tasks reduces the potential efficiency gains of a high division of labor.
Furthermore, being small favors both centralization and lack of specialization. All
three elements of firm strategy consistently favor a collegial distribution of control
rights and the use of lockstep remuneration.
The collegial governance configuration is most feasible if the professionals share
common values and beliefs. Homogeneous values facilitate internal ownership, an
organization structure which is centralized and not formalized, whereas heteroge-
neous values impede these governance characteristics.
The collegial configuration can be characterized by traditional professional
values or entrepreneurial values, but not by corporate values. Both conform to
aspects of the configuration’s governance characteristics, with traditional values
providing the even better fit: Entrepreneurial values favor a low degree of
formalization. Traditional values in addition favor collegial decision-making
structures, and lockstep remuneration. Corporate values, on the other hand, favor
different characteristics, such as hierarchical organization structures, formalization,
and a remuneration system based on individual performance characteristics.
The collegial governance configuration is most likely to occur in PSFs that, in
addition to the above factors, operate in an environment that poses a low risk of
litigation for the PSF.
5.3 Managerial governance
5.3.1 Governance characteristics
Today, aspects of the managerial governance configuration can be observed in many
PSFs, such as major law firms like Baker and McKenzie, multinational accounting
firms like Ernst and Young or KPMG, or large IT consulting firms such as Gapgemini
or Accenture. The managerial governance configuration differs profoundly from the
previously discussed configuration. Principles of professional autonomy and self-
governance are replaced with managerial control, formalization, and a more
hierarchical decision-making style. The changes in governance from a collegial
towards a managerial governance system have been analyzed in longitudinal studies.
In the accounting industry, Deutsche Treuhand Gesellschaft—a founding member of
KPMG (Reihlen et al. 2009)—and Arthur Andersen (Alt 2006) illustrate this
transformation from a collegial to a managerial governance.
Firms closely following the managerial governance configuration are typically
externally owned and have limited liability. While the major accounting firms are
largely excluded from external ownership, they have lobbied intensely for the LLP
and have changed their legal form to that of the LLP where possible.
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Capgemini SA, a French consulting firm, offering a broad range of management
and technology consulting, as well as outsourcing services, is a good example of the
managerial configuration. The managerial configuration applies a hierarchical mode
of decision-making coupled with a degree of decentralization. Capgemini exem-
plifies both hierarchical decision-making as well as the moderately decentralized
organization structure. In its 2007 annual report (Capgemini 2008), the firm states:
‘‘The principle of subsidiarity is .. paramount, meaning that decisions are to be made
as closely as possible to their point of application, and only forwarded to a higher
level when they might have an impact on other units besides the one directly
concerned’’. Nonetheless, the centralized Group Management at Capgemini retains
a significant degree of control and sets rules and standards for the operating units,
which ‘‘entails strict compliance with a certain number of rules relating to finance,
human resources, sales strategy, marketing and communication and legal affairs’’
(Capgemini 2008). Managerial governance is further emphasized in transnational
PSF such as the Big Four accounting firms, which have implemented regionally
integrated partnerships. Under these conditions, firms still remain legally a
partnership, but partners no longer have voting rights on strategic matters in the
partner meetings, as these decisions are now made by a body of elected executives
established at the area governance level (Klimkeit and Reihlen 2012).
The managerial configuration is further characterized by a high degree of
specialization and formalization. The formalization of processes and outputs in the
managerial configuration are best exemplified in Capgemini’s ‘‘I3’’ transformation
program. ‘‘I3’’ stands for industrialization, innovation, and client intimacy. It defines
and implements firm-wide standards such as project delivery methodologies
(Capgemini 2008, 63).
Owing to the standardized nature of the services, the work of individual
professionals can be controlled comparatively easily, and contingent remuneration
is thus less needed in the managerial governance configuration than in other PSFs.
Still these firms will rarely forgo contingent remuneration completely, at least for
their senior professionals. In these cases, scorecard remuneration will be used
primarily. As can be expected for a global, highly diversified PSF, Capgemini’s
remuneration system ‘‘is based on common principles, applied in a decentralized
way and tailored to local job market conditions and regulations […] to reward
performance with a remuneration model that is motivating yet flexible’’ (Capgemini
2009b, 33). The managerial configuration is characterized by permanent positions.
Like most other IT consulting firms, Capgemini does not have an up-or-out
promotion system.
5.3.2 Conditions
As the high degree of formalization suggests, the managerial configuration occurs in
firms offering primarily commoditized services. Capgemini offers a wide range of
services, some more commoditized than others. Still, commoditized services may be
considered the focus of the firm’s service portfolio (Capgemini 2009a). Further-
more, Capgemini’s service offering is highly diversified and characterized by a
large firm size. Capgemini has developed into one of the largest IT-services firms
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worldwide. The large number of acquisitions that the firm made indicates that a
large firm size is indeed a strategic goal of the firm, to utilize economies of scale and
scope in the provision of services to its increasingly global clients. Taken together,
the three aspects of firm strategy (service commoditization, diversification, and size)
specified in our contingency factors offer a consistent explanation for the
governance characteristics of the managerial configuration. For example, all three
factors point to a specialized, hierarchical distribution of control rights, as well as to
the use of individual performance characteristics in the remuneration system.
Managerial governance occurs in firms that depend primarily on capital-intensive
assets suggesting external ownership of the firm. The use of formalized organization
structure and internally developed processes, methods, and tools, such as
RightshoreTM or OTACE by Capgemini’s professionals make individual expert
knowledge more easily replaceable than that of other PSFs, such as the elite law
firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz.
The managerial configuration is found in firms with heterogeneous rather than
homogeneous values and beliefs, as heterogeneous values encourage the adoption of
a formalized, decentralized, and, in connection with external ownership, hierarchi-
cal distribution of control rights. Where values among professionals differ
significantly, these more ‘‘corporate’’ governance characteristics lead to greater
efficiency in decision-making under conditions of cultural diversity. Furthermore,
corporate values are likely to be the predominant values, as they form a consistent
interpretive scheme of the governance characteristics of the managerial
configuration.
The managerial governance typically occurs in firms that face a high risk of
litigation, not least because low service quality is more easily detected in
commoditized services than in highly customized services, and thus becomes the
cause of litigation. The change of governance in the large accounting firms towards
the managerial configuration can be interpreted in part as a reaction to the risk of
litigation by clients, which was perceived in the industry as having increased
significantly (Freedman and Finch 1997). The development of the OTACE quality-
control system by Capgemini can be interpreted as a preventive measure against
disputes with clients regarding service quality.
5.4 Entrepreneurial governance
5.4.1 Governance characteristics
Greenberg Traurig, LLP, a fast-growing Miami-based law firm, epitomizes the
entrepreneurial governance configuration in many respects. Like Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen and Katz, the exemplar of the collegial configuration, Greenberg Traurig is
fairly young for a well-known law firm, having been founded only in 1967. Yet the
two firms could not be more different. In 1997, Cesar Alvarez, who had joined the
firm in 1973, took over as CEO. Under his leadership, the firm expanded rapidly,
both nationally and internationally. At the end of 2008, the firm had about 1,800
lawyers in 32 offices, including two in Europe and two in Asia. Governance of this
configuration is founded on the ‘‘attempt to maximize the entrepreneurialism of
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their members, by creating the maximum possible degree of individual autonomy.
… The benefits (and limitations) of firmwide consistency (in services, in markets,
and in approach) are sacrificed to capture the benefits of .. market opportunities’’
(Maister 1993, 322). The emergence of entrepreneurial governance has been
reported in diverse professional settings (Clark 1998; Maister 1993; Wissema 2009).
Interestingly, the entrepreneurial governance model has also been observed and
subject to intensive debates in the higher education field in Germany (Reihlen and
Wenzlaff 2014) and around the world (Clark 1998).
Like the managerial governance configuration described in the previous section,
the entrepreneurial governance combines a hierarchical decision-making system
with a decentralized distribution of control rights. The entrepreneurial configuration
is in fact more decentralized than its managerial counterpart. While both
configurations also follow commercial, rather than traditional, professional values,
their governance characteristics differ significantly along several dimensions.
The entrepreneurial governance configuration is not characterized by a particular
locus of ownership. While Greenberg Traurig as a LLP is internally owned, there
are externally owned PSFs whose governance characteristics are similar to the
entrepreneurial structure, such as the large advertising conglomerates like WPP.
Also, the internal ownership of Greenberg Traurig is in part due to legal restrictions,
as law-firm ownership in the US is restricted to lawyers. At any rate, the
entrepreneurial governance is characterized by limited liability.
The entrepreneurial governance configuration is characterized by a distribution of
control rights that is at the same time hierarchical and somewhat decentralized. At
Greenberg Traurig, power at the firm level is centralized at the CEO office, with the
14-person executive committee having more of an advisory role. Committees are
disdained as slowing down decision-making. The CEO can decide on a wide range
of issues, such as firm-expansion strategy, hiring of senior professionals, or even
partner compensation, without consulting the wider partnership of the firm (Kolz
2007). At the same time, the individual partners have a high degree of autonomy in
providing their services. In many PSFs, expansion into new practice areas is
cautious and follows lengthy discussions within the partnership. At Greenberg
Traurig, partners act as entrepreneurs with a degree of autonomy (Kolz 2007).
Also, partners are allowed to individually negotiate their hourly rates with clients
if this helps to increase total business, a practice that is discouraged or even
prohibited in many other law firms (Kolz 2007). Partly as a result of such autonomy,
the services offered by firms following the entrepreneurial governance configuration
tend to be highly diversified, resulting in a specialized organization structure. At the
end of 2008, Greenberg Traurig listed 52 (partially overlapping) practice areas and
20 client industries on their website.
The entrepreneurial governance configuration is characterized by a low degree of
formalization. There are few rules and regulations. Not only organizational units
such as practice areas, but also individual senior professionals are controlled mainly
on a financial basis. Low formalization and strong autonomy regarding delivery of
services is offset by strict financial discipline and formalized business planning. At
Greenberg Traurig, the annual partner reviews are said to resemble business
planning meetings. Cesar Alvarez, the CEO, receives detailed daily reports
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regarding the firm’s billing rates, hours billed, and other financial performance
indicators. Attention is focused on those partners that do not meet their agreed
business targets (Kolz 2007).
Owing to the individualistic nature of the governance configuration, coordination
needs are somewhat lower than at other PSFs. In accordance with the combination
of a strong focus on financial success but great autonomy of professionals in other
matters, remuneration in entrepreneurial governance follows an eat-what-you-kill
system. At Greenberg Traurig, bonuses, which constitute a large part of partners’
total income, are mainly based on individual business performance. However, the
compensation system is closed, meaning that the CEO office ultimately decides on
the compensation of individual partners and does not disclose it to the partner group.
This allows the firm to attract senior lateral hires with a high level of compensation
without upsetting existing professionals. Also, reduced performance of individual
professionals is less visible to their peers compared with an open system (Jones
2006; Kolz 2007). On the other hand, this strongly enhances the power of the CEO.
As a result, Greenberg Traurig may, therefore, be more centralized than other firms
following the entrepreneurial governance configuration.
5.4.2 Conditions
The entrepreneurial governance configuration does not depend on a particular
degree of service commoditization. In fact, owing to the high degree of service
diversification, a PSF employing this governance configuration is likely to offer
services of varying degrees of commoditization. The autonomy professionals enjoy
in offering new kinds of services makes it unlikely that such a PSF would offer only
highly customized or highly commoditized services. With its more than 50 practice
areas, Greenberg Traurig has a highly diversified range of services. Also, its services
vary significantly in their degree of commoditization. Entrepreneurial governance is
likely to be found in large PSFs, not least because firms following this configuration
often put a strong emphasis on growth. Greenberg Traurig has grown significantly
throughout its existence, with average annual growth rates between 10 and 20 %.
Together, large firm size and strong service diversification point to several
governance characteristics that distinguish the entrepreneurial configuration from
the collegial configuration, such as a high degree of specialization, decentralization,
and formalization.
The entrepreneurial nature of this configuration allows professionals to utilize
their personal networks and reputations without being restricted by firm rules. Most
PSFs that accept lateral hires welcome professionals with strong client relationships
and personal reputations. At firms following an entrepreneurial governance model,
the eat-what-you-kill remuneration system allows these professionals to profit
directly from their human capital. The strong growth of Greenberg Traurig derived
in large part from its ability to attract senior professionals who had already
developed strong reputations and valuable client relationships.
Professionals at firms that follow the entrepreneurial model are likely to have
somewhat heterogeneous values and beliefs as a result of the diversity of services
they deliver. More important, however, are their shared entrepreneurial values and
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the relative absence of traditional professional values. As in firms following the
managerial configuration, professionals see themselves as experts helping clients to
reach their business objectives, rather than as social trustees delivering a public
service. Moreover, professionals have their own individual business objectives.
Finally, firms following the entrepreneurial governance configuration should
generally have a low to medium risk of litigation. Unless this risk is very low, firms
will usually opt for limited liability but will not adapt other governance
characteristics. A high risk of litigation would call for formalization and
standardization, leading firms closer to the managerial governance configuration.
However, the combination of an entrepreneurial, commercial firm culture and a
decentralized organization with few rules or standards can itself increase the risk of
litigation.
6 Discussion
This article contributes to the literature on PSFs by analyzing different forms of
governance. We chose to follow configuration theory in our approach and developed
four ideal types of PSF governance: the founder-dominated, the collegial, the
managerial, and the entrepreneurial governance configuration. By analyzing both
the PSF literature as well as the relevant general organization studies literature, we
identified seven major design parameters of PSF governance and six contingency
factors, which influence the governance dimensions. Our study provides a synthesis
of the research on PSF governance, which has so far been lacking. In addition, it
also facilitates the comparison of governance developments among very different
PSFs, whereas previous studies often focused on particular professions, such as law
(Morris and Pinnington 1999; Pinnington and Morris 2003) or accounting (Cooper
et al. 1996; Greenwood et al. 1990; Lenz and James 2006), or have limited
themselves to the study of partnerships (Greenwood et al. 1990; Pinnington and
Morris 1996).
6.1 Comparison of PSF governance and PSF archetypes
Our study takes a more differentiated approach to the governance of PSFs. By
looking at multiple governance dimensions and relating them to numerous
contingency factors, this study makes it possible to determine what conditions
facilitate or obstruct configurational coherence. By introducing the founder-
dominated and theorizing on Maister’s hunter type, this study adds two empirically
important governance types that have no equivalent in the PSF governance literature
so far. A comparison of our and the more established organizational archetypes is
presented in Table 3.
Furthermore, our governance configurations allow for more precision and
distinction in describing each governance form. For instance, there is a discrepancy
between the P2 archetype as described by Brock et al. (1999a, 2007) and as
originally developed by (Greenwood et al. 1990). While both focus on governance
aspects close to our collegial governance, the examples used to illustrate the
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archetype differ significantly: The P2 portrayed by Brock et al. (1999a, 2007)
focuses on the smallest PSFs such as the ‘‘neighbourhood law practice’’ (Brock et al.
1999a, 226) and even includes solo practitioners. It can thus be regarded as a hybrid
between the collegial governance and the founder-dominated configurations.
In contrast, Greenwood et al. (1990) originally developed the P2 archetype
looking at large accounting firms that were operating on a national and even
international level. In the description of Greenwood, Hinings and Brown and even
in the earlier account of Montagna (1968) elements of managerial governance can
be identified. As Montagna (1968) states: ‘‘.., the formal managerial decision-
making structure of a Big Eight firm is highly centralized, with a senior partner as
‘resident’ of the firm and chairman of the executive or managing committee. The
committee is composed of partner-directors for each of the firm’s major areas of
specialization, with lines of authority within each area and for each region of the
country. Even though every partner is given personal responsibility over his audit
for the client, the system of checks on his work, along with the formal structure,
allows the firms to be classified as highly centralized.’’ (p. 141). The professional
partnership in the accounting industry can thus be seen as a hybrid between our
collegial and the managerial configuration. In recent years, these firms moved much
closer to the managerial configuration (Brock et al. 2007; Cooper et al. 1996;
Malhotra et al. 2006).
6.2 Evolution of PSF governance
Our approach also contributes to explaining the evolution of PSF governance. The
development of the large accounting partnerships, for instance, towards the
managerial configuration can be explained with the changing conditions that these
firms faced. Most notable are the growth in firm size and the increased
diversification, both in geographical scope and in the increasing importance of
non-accounting services. These changes are well exemplified by a study from Alt
(2006). He analyzed organizational changes taking place at Arthur Andersen, one of
the ‘‘Big Five’’ accounting firms until its involvement in the Enron scandal, which
led to its demise in 2002. Following his analysis, he divides the history of Arthur
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Andersen into four periods. The first period, from 1913 to 1947, is characterized by
the dominant role of the firm’s founder, Arthur E. Andersen, who was managing
director until his death in 1947. During the first period, the firm was managed as a
‘‘one-man professional partnership’’ (Alt 2006, 155) reflecting our founder-
dominated governance configuration. Andersen’s successor Leonard Spacek, who
became managing director in 1947, introduced a democratic decision-making style
and a fusion of ownership and control among partners. In this second period, the
firm expanded significantly and emerged into a professional partnership (Green-
wood et al. 1990) with a collegial governance configuration. The retirement of
Leonard Spacek as Chairman of the firm in 1973 marks the beginning of the third
period (Alt 2006). The rise of IT- and management consulting as new entrepre-
neurial opportunities of the firm led to service diversification and further growth.
Professionals were increasingly specialized and the organizational structure was
characterized by increasing centralization, formalization, and remuneration based
on individual performance. According to Alt, Arthur Andersen transformed into a
‘‘managed professional business’’ (Cooper et al. 1996) during this period. Referring
to our governance configurations, the firm was a hybrid between the collegial and
the managerial configuration. The worldwide partner meeting in 1988 marked the
beginning of the fourth period of Arthur Andersen according to Alt (2006). The
partner meeting was held under the title ‘‘profit & sales’’ and prepared partners for a
stronger focus on clients and business success. In 1992, the 10 % lowest performing
partners had to leave the firm. Control was further centralized, replacing the old
collegial decision-making style. Also, formalization continued with a focus on
business performance turning Arthur Andersen in its fourth period into a ‘‘managed
business’’ (Alt 2006), which is reflected in our managerial configuration. The move
from the collegial towards the managerial governance configuration, driven by such
contingencies as growth in firm size, diversification, and service commoditization,
can be observed in other professional sectors as well, such as law firms (e.g., Cooper
et al. 1996; Galanter and Palay 1991; Morris and Pinnington 1999), investment
banks (Morrison and Wilhelm 2007, 2008), and even in advertising conglomerates
such as WPP (Bower 2003).
6.3 Firm growth and PSF governance
Our study also opens a new research frontier, which has rather been underex-
plored—the relation between PSF governance and the firm’s growth strategy.
Previous research has investigated growth strategies based on knowledge-based
innovations resulting in new practice developments (Anand et al. 2007), interna-
tionalization (Aharoni 1993), and the exploration of new regional markets (Reihlen
et al. 2009), as well as growth opportunities through mergers and acquisitions, and
alliances (Kaiser and Ringlstetter 2011). Yet, very little is known on how the
governance type impacts the firm’s growth strategy. According to configuration
theory, organizations strive for consistency between design parameters and
contingency factors and the interdependencies among organizational elements
create a stable pattern of action resonating around joint themes that reflect the
driving character of the firm. As Miller (1996) argues, the organizational imperative
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or theme—in our case leadership, collegiality, managerial hierarchy, or entrepre-
neurial growth—has ‘‘the most predictive and normative implications, and endows
configurations with their stability’’ (p. 507). Furthermore, the organizational
imperative is reinforced through evolutionary selection and retention processes
based on existing strategies, structures, and systems (Miller 1996).
We suggest that divergent assumptions about the degree of choice firms have
when considering different growth options reflect differences in PSF governance. A
first indication of the relation between governance type and its underlying growth
pattern is given in Fig. 3, which compares the Compound Annual Growth Rates
(CAGR) of two of our illustrative sample firms from the legal profession—
Greenberg Traurig and Wachtell Lipton.
So, for example, firms with a collegial governance such as Wachtell Lipton
follow a ‘‘policy of slow growth, careful recruiting of outstanding people, and, with
only the rarest of exceptions, no lateral entry’’ (Lipton 1990, as cited in Illman 2007,
25). A culture with traditional professional values is created by staff which is
homegrown (Starbuck 1993, 914) supporting close quality monitoring in its core
domain, but also limits expansion into new service domains and regions. The
organizational imperative of Wachtell Lipton is further facilitated by its organic
governance structure, lockstep remuneration, and an up-or-out promotion system.
Furthermore, the small size and slow growth of Wachtell Lipton are also explained
by its limitation to innovative cases and the clear avoidance to expand by mergers
(Illman 2007). On the contrary, firms with entrepreneurial governance such as
Greenberg Traurig emphasize entrepreneurial opportunity seeking and encourage
diverse growth strategies such as diversification and internationalization (Kaiser and
Ringlstetter 2011). Especially diversification and internationalization have deliber-
ately been avoided by Wachtell Lipton as it would have undermined its homogenous
and collegial culture. When Alvarez took over as CEO in 1997 at Greenberg and
Fig. 3 Comparison of annual growth rates between Greenberg Traurig and Wachtell Lipton. Source:
Data gathered from Kolz (2007), http://fundinguniverse.com, company websites http://www.gtlaw.com,
website http://www.wlrk.com, and http://www.fundinguniverse.com
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Traurig, he emphasized autonomy of individual professionals combined with a
strong focus on profitability and growth aided by a remuneration system and
entrepreneurial culture that reinforced this imperative. Greenberg Traurig has,
therefore, grown significantly over a period of more than 40 years. In this way, we
argue that growth strategies of firms are constrained by previous acceptance of
organizational values and practices reflecting the characteristics of the governance
configuration. This study suggests that a focus on PSF governance configurations
may lead to further insights into processes of organizational growth. If growth
strategies and governance models operate in tandem, then future studies investi-
gating this link may provide further insight into the evolutionary patterns of growth
and the underlying organizational mechanisms accountable for them.
7 Limitations and future research
Following Rorty (1991, 81) ‘‘[t]heories and perspectives draw our attention to
certain issues; they invite us to punctuate the world in particular ways; they are tools
for doing things, rather than mere representations of the world as it allegedly is’’.
Configuration theory offers such a particular way of abstracting from reality by
building ideal types and thus offering a way of conceptualizing the problem of
governance (for a broader discussion see Dess et al. 1993; Meyer et al. 1993; Miller
1996; Miller and Mintzberg 1983; Short et al. 2008; Wolf 2000). While our
suggested PSF governance configurations are products of ideation (Bunge 1996),
they are informed by previous empirical studies of various professions. The first
limitation is the empirical basis of our study consisting mainly of findings from the
Anglo-American law and accounting professions. Whenever possible, we added
insights from other professions or professional industries, such as architecture,
consulting, advertising or investment banking. By incorporating theoretical studies
and looking at the underlying factors that favor or undermine certain governance
models, we attempted to reduce the problem of overgeneralization from a limited
empirical basis. Nevertheless, future empirical research should focus on PSFs
outside the well-researched law and accounting professions. It is likely that during
these studies additional contingency factors will emerge.
A second limitation is the depth of available empirical studies, which also varies
regarding the contingency factors discussed in this article. Firm size and service
diversification have been studied extensively regarding PSFs and other organiza-
tions. On the contrary, how values and beliefs of professionals affect firm
governance constitute a rather new research area. In addition to the more commonly
proposed distinction between professional and commercial values in the PSF
literature, we suggest to extend studies to explore empirically the nature and impact
of entrepreneurial values.
From a managerial perspective, our configurations serve an important heuristic
function in providing practitioners with design-repertoires. These general design-
repertoires (a configuration is such a design repertoire) can be translated and
customized to the context-specific conditions of a unique firm at hand (van Aken
2004). As the world of PSFs is changing and as PSFs are moving through different
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stages of development, our study may serve managers to evaluate how their firm’s
governance model should be adapted in order to respond to new emerging
conditions.
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